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Abstract 
This essay explores the nature, the functioning, and the economic and policy implications of markets 
for technology. Today, the outsourcing of research and development activities is more common 
than in the past, and specialized technology suppliers have emerged in many industries. In a sense, 
the Schumpeterian vision of integrating R&D with manufacturing and distribution is being 
confronted by the older Smithian vision of division of labor. 
The existence and efficacy of markets for technology can profoundly influence the creation and 
diffusion of new knowledge, and hence, economic growth of countries and the competitive position 
of companies. The economic and managerial literatures have touched upon some aspects of the 
nature of these markets. However, a thorough understanding of how markets for technology work is 
still lacking. In this essay we address two main questions. First, what are the factors that enable a 
market for technology to exist and function effectively? Specifically we look at the role of industry 
structure, the nature of knowledge, and intellectual property rights and related institutions. Second, 
we ask what the implications of such markets are for the boundaries of the firm, the specialization 
and division of labor in the economy, industry structure, and economic growth. We build on this 
discussion to develop the implications of our work for public policy and corporate strategy. 
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1. Introduction 
This essay explores the nature, the functioning, and the economic and policy 
implications of markets for the exchange of intermediate technological inputs. By the latter 
we mean inputs like pharmaceutical or chemical compounds discovered in laboratories, new 
product designs or prototypes, algorithms and basic software programs, process designs and 
technologies, engineering and other intangible knowledge embodied in blueprints and 
designs, or sold through consultancy services. 
Markets for technology have become increasingly important. Since World War n, 
large firms have been responsible for the bulk of privately funded R&D, typically conducted 
in-house. However, over the last ten-fifteen years a variety of "outsourcing" arrangements 
ranging from R&D joint ventures and partnerships, to licensing contracts and contracted R&D 
appear to have grown substantially. Alongside, specialized technology suppliers have 
emerged in many industries. 1 Given the importance of innovation for economic growth and 
competitive success, it is important to understand when markets for technology arise and how 
they function. 
Some of these topics have been studied in some detail. For instance, there is an 
extensive literature on technology licensing, international technology transfer, and on the 
economic and managerial consequences of outsourcing, particularly technology outsourcing. 
However, what is still lacking is a systematic understanding of how markets for technology 
work, what limits or gives rise to them, and what their economic and policy implications are. 
In other words, what we need is a comprehensive framework for integrating existing studies 
that shed light on the existence, working and the consequences of markets for technology. 
This essay is a first step in filling this gap. 
We begin by reviewing the available evidence about markets for technology in Section 
2. We offer several examples of industries and technologies to illustrate the main points. In 
the next section we discuss the main factors that limit their creation and the factors that can 
relax these constraints. While Section 4 addresses the relationship between market size, 
industry structure and the functioning of markets for technology, Section 5 explores the role 
of competition in spurring the growth of these markets. Section 6 focuses on an important 
challenge to the proper functioning of markets for technology: the fragmentation of 
intellectual property rights and the potential tragedy of the "anti-commons". Section 7 
discusses the effects of markets for technology on the growth of the downstream industries 
and on the geographical distribution of technological activities. Section 8 looks at the 
implications for corporate strategy and economic and industrial policy. Section 9 concludes. 
2. Markets for technology 
2.1 The size and scope of markets for technology 
Can and do markets for technology that is not embodied in physical artifacts exist? 
Lamoreaux and Sokoloff(1997 and 1998) have documented the presence ofan active market 
for technology in the US during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Based on a study 
of the glass industry, they also argue that a well-articulated organizational and geographical 
differentiation between inventive activity and commercialization of invention existed at that 
time. Mowery (1983) shows that before World War n, US corporations relied upon 
I Markets for technology and outsourcing of research are not new. Mowery (1983), Mowery and Rosenberg 
(1989) discuss trends in the outsourcing ofR&D in the early part of the 20th century in the US. Lameroux and 
Sokoloff (1998) document the existence of a market for patent licenses in the US in the late 19th century. 
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contracted R&D, although over time this dependence decreased.2 Other papers attest to the 
market for technology for chemical processes (Freeman, 1968; Arora and Gambardella, 1998; 
Arora and Fosfuri, 1998a; Merges, 1998), and biotechnology (e.g., Arora and Gambardella, 
1990; Powell and Brantley, 1992; and Zucker et al., 1998). 
In recent years we have seen a number of examples of "strategic alliances", ranging 
from R&D joint ventures and partnerships, spin-offs, corporate venture capital, licensing 
deals, and a variety of "outsourcing" deals, signaling the increasing importance of 
transactions for intangible technology. Table 1 shows the total number and value of such 
transactions, by industrial sector, between 1985 and 1997. The data are from a commercial 
database provided by the Securities Data Corporation, the leading commercial provider of 
such data.3 The value of a transaction is calculated here as the sum of licensing and royalty 
payments, and equity investments and R&D funding provided in return for licensing rights. 
As table 1 shows, there have been over 7,800 transactions in technology with a total 
value of over $210 billion, implying an average of nearly 600 transactions worth $15 billion 
per year. To put these numbers in perspective, note that the total R&D spending in the US, 
Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy and Canada was about $340 billion, and non-defense 
R&D spending was about $300 billion in 1995. Thus, the total technology transactions are of 
the order of5% of total non-defense R&D spending in the developed countries.4 Although 
markets for technology are still in their infancy in many cases, the value of the transactions is 
already substantial. Table 1 also shows that the transactions are concentrated in few sectors, 
notably chemicals, software, electrical and non-electrical machinery, and engineering and 
professional services. These sectors together account for the bulk of transactions (both source 
and recipient of technology), and as expected, are also a net source of technology for other 
sectors. Figure 1 shows that the number of these transactions has been steadily increasing 
over time (with the exception of the last two years in our sample, possibly reflecting 
incomplete reporting oftransactions for these years). 
These figures do not included mergers and acquisitions. To be sure, outright 
acquisition can also facilitate exchange of technology. Therefore, insofar as acquisitions are 
driven by the need to acquire external technology, these should be included in the market for 
technology. However, acquisitions bring not only technology, but also the capability and 
competence to develop new technologies .. The set of issues that surround the acquisition of 
technological capability is rather different from that pertaining to the acquisition of 
technology. Therefore, in this essay, we shall exclude acquisitions from our purview. 
We shall also largely ignore another important channel through which technological 
knowledge moves across firm boundaries both at the national and international level, namely 
the movement of people. The omission is not indicative of the importance. The diffusion of 
knowledge through the movement of people is one of the many ways in which knowledge is 
said to spillover across firms. The question of spillovers has attracted a great deal of attention 
from economists and there is a large theoretical literature analyzing the implications for the 
2 Mowery (1983) also notes that outsourced R&D was limited in scope and fIrms with strong in-house 
capabilities were more likely to outsource R&D as well. 
3 The SDC data are constructed from SEC fIlings (lO-Qs), fmancialjournals, news wire services, proxies and 
quarterly reports. We read through each transaction to verify that technology transfer was involved. From the 
description of the agreement, we also coded the granter or recipient of the technology, or whether there was a 
two-way flow of technology, such as a technology cross-licensing agreement. 
4 There are a number of possible biases going in both directions. For instance, the fIgures for equity purchase 
may include payments for non-technology assets. On the other hand, our database probably does not include a 
large number of smaller value transactions, and we are undercounting transactions from 1985 and 1986, as well 
as 1996 and 1997. 
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incentives to do R&D (e.g., Cohen and Levinthal, 1989), and another large empirical 
literature that attempts to measure the extent and impact of such spillovers on economic 
measures of performance such as productivity (e.g., Griliches, 1979; Jaffe, 1986). However, a 
part of what are called spillovers may in fact be market-mediated transfers of knowledge. 5 
Indeed, Zucker et al. (1998) argue that knowledge spillovers across nearby universities and 
Californian biotechnology firms in California are in fact the outcome of identifiable market 
exchanges of technologies. We speculate that the neglect of the possibility of market 
mediated knowledge flows may have resulted in over-estimates of the importance of 
knowledge spillovers. However, ambitious as this paper is, to include inter-firm movement of 
engineers and researchers would be unworkable.6 
2.2 The key benefits of a market for technology and division of innovative labor 
The easiest way to describe a "market for technology" is by contrasting it with the 
dominant mode of organizing innovation in the 20th century -- vertical integration between 
invention and commercialization.7 Although this arrangement offers the advantage of 
reducing transaction costs (both contractual and cognitive), it brings with it two major 
disadvantages that arise from the restricted use of technology. 
The first disadvantage is that technology is under-utilized. Technology, once created, 
can be transferred elsewhere at only a fraction of the cost of developing it in the first place. 
Since there are limits to how large a firm can grow, a firm that develops a technology can 
potentially gain by selling it to other firms, including firms in other industries and countries. 
These benefits are even greater if the innovating firm is incapable or unwilling to exploit the 
technology itself. But when selling technology is difficult - i.e., when the market for 
technology is underdeveloped and inefficient -- these gains from trade cannot be realized. 
Until recently, most large firms have typically ignored such possible gains.8 One explanation 
for this neglect is the infamous ''Not-Invented-Here'' syndrome, which is thought to inflict 
many large firms and which also leads them to reject already developed and possibly su~erior 
technologies in favor of in-house development (see for instance, Katz and AlIen, 1982). 
The second disadvantage is that the rate of technological innovation itself may be 
lower when markets for technology are absent. With a tight organizational integration 
between invention and commercialization, firms that lack commercialization capabilities have 
5 Eric von Rippel's work on information exchange shows that non-market based information exchange is also 
prevalent in some sectors (von Rippel, 1988). 
6 The issue of international technology transfer through the movement of people has been addressed by several 
authors although rarely in a systematic way. See for instance, Bell and Pavitt, 1993; Caves, 1996; Blomstrom 
and Kokko, 1998; and Fosfuri et al., 1998. The importance of the movement of people as a key mechanism for 
the international transfer of technology has been emphasized also by economic historians. See for instance 
Jeremy (1981) for the later industrialization of North America and Landes (1969) and Henderson (1965) for the 
case of France and Germany. 
7 Research universities are of course not part of this vertical integration. 
8 A recent study by a British-based consulting company (BTG, 1998) surveyed 133 companies in the US, 
Western Europe and Japan. The study found that these companies ignore more than 35% of their patented 
technologies because they do not fit into their core business operations. Many of these so-called "orphan 
technologies" would have commercial value if they were licensed or sold. The study estimated that US 
companies do not profitably use about $115 billion of technology assets. Moreover, the study found that the 
reason why companies do not sell these technologies is not because licensing is unattractive but simply because 
they do not take this possibility into account. Even if the figures reported by BTG are overestimates, they are 
suggestive of the potential benefits of a market for technology. 
9 The European Union estimated that in Europe 20 billions US dollars are spent every year to develop new 
products or ideas that have already been developed elsewhere. (See www.european-patent-
office.org/patinfopro/index.htm. ) 
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no incentives to invest in innovation. Hence, the dominant mode of innovation acts as a drag 
on the innovative output of the economy. Small firms, which many studies have also found to 
be inventive, are the most penalized by this organizational arrangement. A market for 
technology, which enables inventors to sell their inventions to others that can commercialize 
and use them more efficiently, can address both of these issues. lo Put differently, a division 
of labor between inventors and the users of inventions is likely to be beneficial (Arora and 
Gambardella, 1994). 
Prior research suggests that such a division of labor would be beneficial. Merges 
(1998) interprets the property rights paradigm associated with Grossman-Hart-Moore as 
implying that research will typically be more efficient when "owned" by the research unit. 
Aghion and Tirole (1994) analyze a model where a research unit contracts with a prospective 
user ( a licensee). In their model, the research unit should "own" the invention but if it faces 
capital constraints, it may be forced to concede ownership to the licensee. Ownership by the 
licensee, because it reduces the incentives of the research unit, results in inefficiently low 
levels of research effort. Arrow (1983) argues that small firms are more inventive because 
innovation flows more easily and incentives can be better aligned. Landau (1998), reflecting 
on his own experience as a founder and manager of an innovative chemical process 
technology firm, notes that smaller firms have a number of advantages: Better incentives for 
bench scientists, effective two way information flows between managers and researchers, and 
quick managerial decision making, including the ability to stop projects that appear 
unpromlsmg. 
The survey of empirical evidence in Cohen (1995), on balance, appears consistent 
with the idea that small firms are more innovative, at least in some respect, than large firms. 
(See for example Acs (1996) and Acs and Audretsch (1993).) However, Cohen and Klepper 
(1996) have argued that the greater R&D productivity of smaller firms may reflect greater 
incentives of larger firms to invest in R&D due to their ability to amortize R&D over a larger 
volume of sales. This leads large firms to invest in less promising projects as well, lowering 
the average productivity ofR&D. Griliches (1990) has argued that the greater observed 
productivity may be a consequence of sample selection and under-reporting ofR&D in small 
firms. 
One problem with the empirical evidence is that it has tended to compare within 
industries. As our case studies below show, a division of innovative labor is likely to involve 
firms upstream and downstream of the industry in question. Put differently, the point of a 
division of innovative labor is that different types offirms are more efficient at different 
stages of economic activity. This point goes back at least to lewkes et al. (1958) when they 
noted that technical advance in an industry depends on the interactions between firms that 
differ in expertise and other attributes, including size. Nelson, Peck and Kalachek (1967) and 
Scherer (1980), among others, have emphasized similar ideas. In sum, a key benefit of 
markets for technology is that they promote the division of labor in the production and use of 
technology. 
Although a division of innovative labor is an important implication of markets for 
technology, the latter also includes the sale and transfer of comprehensive technology 
packages, particularly across national boundaries. The literature on international technology 
transfer is vast but has tended to focus on the desirability and problems of such transfers (see 
for instance, Lall, 1980; Frischtak and Rosenberg, 1985; Vaitsos, 1993), while others have 
focused on the contractual forms and their respective costs (see for instance, Contractor, 1981; 
10 This is strongly reminiscent of the classical argument by Smith (1776), Young (1929), and Stigler (1951) 
where the benefits from division of labor arise when a certain activity is characterized by increasing returns. 
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Vishwasrao, 1994; Wright, 1993). Perhaps understandably, this literature has largely 
remained confined to the field of international management and economic development, 
remaining quite distinct from the literature on innovation and technological change. One of 
our objectives in this essay is to build a conceptual framework that encompasses both 
technology transfer as well as the division of innovative labor. 
As is often the case, real life markets for technology do not always involve neat and 
tidy sale and purchase of technology. As with many other types of markets involving 
differentiated and variegated products, transactions for technology are typically not merely 
"money for technology". Instead, they often involve formal and informal ties between 
parties, using a variety of institutional arrangements to facilitate the transaction. The point is 
that where such transactions are common, they encourage the growth of firms that specialize 
in the production and sale of new knowledge. Our three cases below illustrate this point. 
2.3 Specialized engineering firms (SEFs) and the division of innovative labor in the 
chemical processing industry 
Freeman's pioneering study (1968) pointed to the role of firms that provided design, 
engineering and construction services to the chemical and oil industry. More recent studies 
(Landau and Rosenberg, 1992; Arora and Gambardella, 1998; and Arora, Fosfuri and 
Gambardella, 1998) have provided further evidence on the role that some of these so-called 
"specialized engineering firms" (SEFs) have played in the development and improvement and 
diffusion of new chemical processes. Before world war II, most chemical processes were 
designed and engineered by the chemical firms themselves (Freeman, 1968). After world war 
II, the development of the discipline of chemical engineering provided a unifying basis for 
conceptualizing chemical processes as consisting of a combination of a basic "functional" 
elements that were common across different chemical processes. (See Rosenberg, 1998.) This 
encouraged the growth of specialized firms (the SEFs) engaged in the design and engineering 
of processes. 
A study based on more than 20,000 plants constructed all over the world during the 
1980s shows that SEFs provide the engineering expertise for more than two thirds of all 
chemical plants (Arora and Gambardella, 1998). They also license the technology for nearly 
35% of all chemical plants constructed during this period (see figure 2).11 SEFs have been 
particularly important in two areas: catalytic processes, and engineering design improvements. 
UOP has a number of innovative catalytic refining and reforming processes, which it has 
licensed widely. Scientific Design pioneered a number of new pathways to produce basic inputs 
for synthetic fibers and plastics, such as the air oxidation process for para-xylene (used for 
polyester). Other SEFs, such as Kellog (high-pressure processes for ammonia) and Badger 
(fluidized bed catalytic processes) have made significant contributions to engineering design. 
Not only are SEFs important sources oftechnology, but as we discuss in Section 5 below, the 
existence of independent technology suppliers also has an important impact on the incentives 
of the producers themselves to license their technologies (Arora, 1997; and Arora and Fosfuri, 
1998b). Arora and Fosfuri (1998a) show that in chemical sub-sectors where SEFs are 
important sources of technology, chemical companies themselves tend to license their own 
technologies more actively. 
11 Interestingly enough, the role of SEFs as providers of engineering and design services has remained roughly 
constant since the 1960s, and their share of technology licenses seems to have risen slightly since then. (See 
Freeman, 1968.) 
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2.4 The division of innovative labor in life sciences 
The story of biotechnology startups in generating new discoveries in life sciences is 
well known and well studied, and we will review it very briefly. (See for instance, Arora and 
Gambardella, 1990; Powell and Bantley, 1996; Zucker et aI., 1998; Lemer and Merges, 1998). 
Initially these firms began by leveraging their superior access to recombinant DNA 
technology and hybridoma technology (monoclonal antibodies). Although most academic 
research in this area has conceived of the biotechnology firms as discovering new drugs, this 
is not the only type of division of labor that prevails in the biotechnology industry. Over time 
startups have established areas of comparative advantage in a variety of generic technologies 
for discovering and developing new drugs. These include PCR (Polymerase Chain Reaction), 
protein structure modeling, rapid computer based drug assay and testing, recombinant 
chemistry techniques, drug delivery systems, and chemical separation and purification. 
Merges (1998) provides a number of examples of other types of firms that might be 
thought of as the SEFs of the pharmaceutical and fine chemicals industry. Firms such as 
Catalytica, ChemDesign and SepraChem are leveraging research and their expertise in 
asymmetric synthesis to develop new processes for the production of pharmaceuticals and key 
pharmaceutical intermediates. 1 These firms both develop proprietary technologies and, 
either license them to pharmaceutical and specialty chemical companies, or enter into 
alliances to supply the latter with purer and better inputs. Interestingly enough, Merges 
(1998) also notes that this trend has induced some established producers to spinning off units 
to provide contracted process development and manufacturing services to the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
Although one can find reasons for a division of innovative labor to be more likely in 
the life sciences and chemicals, the phenomenon is not restricted to these two areas, as the 
next example shows. 
2.5 Fabless fabs and the division of innovative labor in semiconductors 
In the 1980s, the semiconductor industry witnessed the rise of the fabless fabs. 
Hitherto, semiconductor design was integrated with the manufacture, and the leaders in 
semiconductor design technology, such as Texas Instruments, Intel, and IBM were also major 
producers. The new startups specialized in designing semiconductors but did not have the 
production capabilities (and hence, were fabless). Correspondingly, merchant foundries, such 
as Taiwan Semiconductors emerged to fabricate the chips based on the designs being 
delivered by the design houses. The division of innovative labor proceeded with the rise of 
firms, such as Cadence Design Systems and Mentor Graphics, which developed software 
tools for designing chips. 
More recently, as semiconductor chips have become more complex, this process has 
taken a further step with the emergence of firms that specialize in producing cores, or 
components of the overall semiconductor chip design (e.g., Advanced Risc in UK, Mips 
Technologies, Rambus, Phoenix Technologies and ISS). The great advantage is that the 
component may be used in several types of semiconductors, thus lowering overall costs. 
These developments have been helped by the Virtual Socket Interface Alliance, a consortium 
of over 180 firms that has tried to promote industry wide standards. Observers believe that if 
a market for chip design components - a market for technology - takes root in the 
semiconductor industry, it would enhance the prospects of being able to design a chip that 
incorporates all electronic functions, also called a "system on a chip". Industry sources 
12 In this case, a key expertise lies in being able to produce and isolate the desired chiral form of the molecule. 
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predict that the merchant intellectual property component market will grow from about $600 
million in 1997 to $2 billion in 2001 (Grove, 1998a). 
As these case studies show, the markets for technology can be structured in a variety 
of ways and evolve over time. The structure of the market has important implications for both 
corporate strategy and policy. For one, it conditions how the rents ("value" in management 
terms) are divided along the knowledge value chain. For instance, technology integrators that 
control scarce and difficult to replicate complementary assets may be able to extract a large 
fraction of the rents. By contrast, in more dispersed markets like semiconductors, the 
different parts of the knowledge value chain may be more balanced. 
In some cases, such as biotechnology, the market structure is relatively 
straightforward. Biotechnology startups form the link between basic science (often at 
universities) and established pharmaceutical firms that typically develop drugs, obtain 
regulatory clearances and market the drugs. In a sense, the technology value chain is simple 
with relatively few branches. In chemicals, the value chain is more complicated, with major 
product and process innovations typically emerging from chemical and oil firms, but with 
detailed process development taking place in cooperation with SEFs. Further, SEFs typically 
improve and refine the process and frequently handle licensing arrangements as well. In other 
industries, such as aerospace engines, the division of innovative labor is centered around an 
integrator, typically engine producers such as Rolls Royce and General Electric. The 
technology integrators maintain a broad range of technical and scientific capabilities that 
cover the product in question. 
3. Factors limiting the division of innovative labor 
Markets for technology are not synonymous with a vertical division of labor between 
a specialized sector of upstream suppliers of the technologies and the downstream firms using 
them. The latter is, however, an important dimension of an analysis of markets for 
technology and many of the benefits of markets for technology come from the development of 
a division of innovative labor. Despite their many advantages, there are two main reasons 
why markets for technology may not function well, resulting in a very restricted division of 
labor in inventive activity. 
The first reason is associated with cognitive aspects. Knowledge or technologies 
developed in a certain context may not be equally useful in other contexts. This is because 
there are context-dependent features in their production and in their use that cannot be readily 
translated when applied to different domains. Hence, the users may not find the technology 
useful when it is not developed by them, and tailored to their needs. Context dependence is 
also closely related to the tacitness of knowledge that many writers since Polanyi (1966) have 
noted. Tacitness of technology increases the cost of transferring technology across contexts 
such as from one firm to another. 
The second reason is the one that has received most of the attention in the economics 
and managerial literature and is related to transaction costs and opportunism. When 
technologies are not embodied in tangible goods and cannot be protected by property rights, 
selling the technology becomes difficult. The economics literature has analyzed this situation 
as a problem of selling information. As Arrow (1962) first noted, seller and buyer may find 
difficult to put a value on the information without knowing it in detail. Furthermore, having 
learned the information, the potential buyer has no incentives to pay for it. Finally, 
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information, once produced, can be reused without further cost. Opp:0rtunism may then 
prevent the realization of contracts for the exchange of information. 3 
Since real world contracts are of necessity incomplete (Dawson et aI., 1982; Hart and 
Moore, 1988), these problems are compounded. Thus, the transaction cost perspective 
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975) would imply that such transactions could be more 
efficiently executed inside firms rather than across firms. Teece (1986), in a seminal paper, 
made this link, arguing that firms wishing to capture the rents from new technology creation 
should acquire complementary capabilities for commercializing the technology, such as 
production and marketing capabilities. 
We explore both these aspects below. 
3.1 Cognitive determinants of a "division of innovative labor" 
Division of labor requires that the task at hand be decomposed into smaller sub-tasks, 
and that the outputs of these subtasks be integrated effectively. There are two important 
considerations. First, the ability to conceive of the task in terms of combinations of sub-tasks, 
and second, to choose to partition tasks in such a way as to minimize the cost of information 
exchange across the sub-tasks. Eric von Hippel (1990 and 1994) has made a seminal 
contribution in this context. 
As von Hippel has convincingly demonstrated, being able to break up or partition a 
problem-solving task increases efficiency and productivity. Partitioning, however, requires 
information exchange in order to integrate the results effectively and because one sub-task 
may require information generated elsewhere (e.g., Iansiti, 1995). The problem is that some 
information is "sticky" and difficult to move across contexts. This "stickiness" increases the 
costs of a division of labor because the latter would greatly increase the cost of information 
exchange. In a sense, von Hippel can be read as implicitly offering a theory of the division of 
innovative labor and the boundary of the firm. For instance he discusses the case of the 
information flows between the designers of the sheet-metal parts that make up the surface of 
an automobile, and the designers of the dies used to produce these parts. In this case the 
amount of overlapping information and joint problem-solving activity is so high that it would 
be hard to partition this problem into independent tasks, with the designers of the metal part 
being partaken from the die designers. Accordingly, it makes sense to integrate the design of 
dies and metal parts in the same organization. The point is that the extent to which the 
innovation process is integrated within one firm rather than decentralized depends importantly 
on the extent to which an innovation activity can be effectively task-partitioned. 
In a subsequent paper, von Hippel (1998) noted that the if the sticky information could 
be "unstuck", interdependencies could be substantially reduced. He further argued that there 
are important asymmetries across users and producers in their ability and incentives to 
"unstick" this information. Specifically, he argued that it is more efficient for the supplier to 
"unstick" his information because it would imply a one time cost and because user context 
vary and may be harder to generalize. The development of computers has given a boost to 
this task partitioning because information can be embodied in software and made available 
cheaply and in a useful form. The burgeoning market for software tools and solutions of 
13 Zeckhauser (1996) has su~arized many of the challenges in contracting for technological information. 
These include the fuzzy demarcation of intellectual boundaries by patents, the presence of asymmetric 
information, the complexity of the good at stake and the large tacit component of technological knowledge. 
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various kinds, ranging from production and inventory planning to semi-conductor design to 
solvers for optimization problems, attests to the power of this idea. 14 
A complementary perspective is provided by Arora and Gambardella (1994). Here, 
the focus is on the costs of information exchange, and how the nature of the information to be 
exchanged and the underlying knowledge base - the context - affects the cost of information 
exchange. Simply put, information is sticky because it is context dependent. Context 
dependence arises because we often lack a complete understanding of the technology. Firms 
have to produce goods, methods or processes that work in practice. In order to do so, often it 
is neither necessary nor sufficient to understand the scientific principles underlying the 
technology. For example, a pharmaceutical compound tested against a certain disease cannot 
be used for other diseases that may act on the same cells without a deep understanding of how 
the compound acts in the human organism. Absent such a deep understanding, humans use 
heuristics, shortcuts and rules of thumb, in order to structure problems (e.g., Simon, 1959). 
Such structuring provides the context and framework within which humans interpret 
information, but insofar as the frameworks differ between two people or firms, they also make 
it harder to transfer information. Thus the knowledge and the technologies developed by 
firms tend to be context-dependent, and difficult to transfer outside of the domain in which 
they are created. 
A key factor in reducing the importance of this constraint is the growth in physical, 
biological and engineering sciences. This provides the opportunity of comprehending in new 
ways what is already known, abstracting from the idiosyncratic and contextual features of 
specific applications, so that what is known can be generalized to encompass several 
applications. Abstract and generalized knowledge tends to be better articulated and easier to 
codify in useful ways. In recent years, the growth of computing capabilities, both hardware 
and software, have given a big boost to the growth of such general and abstract knowledge. 
This has made possible a greater separation between the production of general-pwyose 
knowledge -- of general and abstract knowledge -- and the use of such knowledge. 5 
Thus, Arora and Gambardella's analysis complements von Hippel's by exploring the 
determinants of "information stickiness". Unsticking information requires that the 
information be presented in a form that others outside the context can understand, use and 
manipulate. For this, the ability to comprehend the specific information in a general and 
abstract way becomes crucial. So is the ability to embed the information in a software 
program that others can use (and complement with their own context specific information). 
Together, they reduce the costs of information exchange and the division oflabor. 
We should.emphasize that the separation does not imply that the application of the 
upstream knowledge is simple or straightforward. Neither does it imply that information 
flows only one way. It does imply that these information flows are more structured, with 
information flows from downstream applications feeding back into developing more general 
knowledge upstream, which is then made available in various ways for downstream 
application. 
Indeed, successful users of technological knowledge themselves may need to be 
technologically very sophisticated, particularly in the case of the purchase of upstream, 
general knowledge. Such technological sophistication on the part of buyers may require them 
to maintain significant in-house research capabilities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Rosenberg, 
14 Similarly, Langlois (1992) emphasized the importance ofmodularity in production and in R&D, and offered 
other examples drawn in particular from the electronics industry. (See also Langlois and Robertson, 1992.) 
IS The use of the knowledge may not be simple and straightforward. It may itself require creating new 
knowledge. The latter is likely, at least in the first instance, to be more limited in scope and application. 
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1990; Arora and Gambardella, 1994). Eventually, as the technological trajectory displays 
signs of maturity, the cognitive and other costs involved in technology transfer may overcome 
the advantages that outside specialists may enjoy. 
In other words, the cognitive perspective suggests a dynamic process, with major new 
technological and scientific breakthroughs possibly resulting in the growth of specialized 
technology producers whose advantages diminish as increasingly knowledgeable buyers 
internalize research in-house. We speculate that this dynamic process underlies the historical 
trends observed over the last century. A market for technology appears to have flourished, at 
least in the US, around the turn of the century. This was supplanted by vertical integration 
between research and production beginning sometime in the early 1900s, with the 1980s again 
marking the growth of specialized technology suppliers. 
3.2 Transaction costs and contracting for technology 
Relaxing the cognitive constraint is only necessary, not sufficient, for a market for 
technology to be realized. The difficulties in writing contracts to sell technology are widely 
accepted. Arrow (1962) is widely regarded as the first formal statement of the problem, 
although Nelson (1959) clearly anticipated the basic argument. Williamson (1975) noted that 
contracts in general tend to be inefficient when there is uncertainty, small numbers 
bargaining, and when there are non-contractible aspects of the transaction. Typically, the 
literature has appealed to the tacit nature of technological knowledge and the ineffectiveness 
of intellectual property rights in preventing imitators from inventing around to argue that 
contracting for technology is likely to be difficult and costly (see for instance, Teece, 1988).16 
For instance, researchers have noted the problems posed by uncertainty (Bonaccorsi and 
Pammoli, 1996) and small numbers bargaining (Pisano, 1990) in contracting for technology. 
In a similar vein, there is a growing literature on international technology transfer which 
appeals to transaction costs to explain the use of wholly-owned subsidiary vis-a.-vis arm's 
length contract as a means for the transfer of technology across national boundaries. (S~e for 
instance, Dunning 1981; Markusen, 1995.) The transaction cost argument underpins the 
widely held belief that tacitness of technology and the associated information asymmetries 
and uncertainty cause insurmountable difficulties in contracting for technology. 
Although there is some truth to this view, it is too pessimistic. At least under some 
circumstances, the tacitness of technology by itself does not pose any major difficulties. 
Arora (1995) shows that, under certain conditions, one can write simple contracts for the 
exchange of tacit knowledge. The two key conditions under which these contracts can be 
written are that: a) the tacit and codified components of the technology are complementary, 
and they are bundled together in a technology package; b) the codified component is protected 
by intellectual property rights. 17 
The intuition of the model is simple. Suppose that the licensor and the licensee agree 
to exchange a certain amount of know-how X The licensee pays an up-front fee of Tj, and 
the licensor supplies the know-how. Opportunism may arise because, once the know-how is 
16 The transaction costs view, by stressing the non-contractible nature of tacit knowledge, is linked to the 
property rights view of Coase (1937) and others. The latter underscores the importance of clearly defmed 
property rights for a market to develop. We argue here that one does not need to have all the property rights 
defined and enforced for markets to function. However, as we argue here, markets for technology do require 
some intellectual property rights to be well defmed and adequately protected. 
17 Although only straight licensing is analyzed in this model, clearly a variety of intermediate arrangements are 
possible, including.cooperative R&D, buybackor supply arrangements,equity investments and option contracts, 
and joint-ventures. We cannot explore each of them in any detail. The essential point is that all these are means 
of facilitating the exchange between producers and users of technology. 
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transferred, the licensee may refuse to pay a second fee of T2 that the parties agreed to pay 
after the know-how was supplied. Knowing this, the licensor may not supply the optimal 
amount of know-how, and the licensee may not agree to pay the initial fee in the first place, 
leading to the widely expected market failure. 
But assume that the know-how can only be used with a complementary codified input 
which is protected by a patent. The licensor can always withdraw the license for the patented 
components, which would prevent the licensee to realize the full value of the know-how if she 
refuses to pay the second fee. This "credible" hostage encourages the licensee to pay the 
second fee. The model also assumes that the wider the scope of the patent, the smaller the 
value that can be realized by the licensee from the innovation if she refuses to pay the second 
period license, compared to the value that she would realize with the patented component. 
This is a reasonable assumption as broader patents make it more difficult to "invent around" 
(see for instance, Gallini, 1992). 
The main result of the model is that if the scope of the patent is larger than a certain 
threshold, the parties can agree on two lump sum fees TJ and T2 such that the licensor has an 
incentive to provide the first best amount of know-how X. For patent scope smaller than the 
threshold, the amount of know-how that is exchanged increases with the scope of the patent. 
Moreover, the amount of know-how exchanged through the contract is higher the stronger the 
complementarity between the tacit and codified components. Thus, strong intellectual 
property rights are key for realizing the·full benefits of a market for technology. IS 
This is more than a mere theoretical possibility. The model explains many real world 
features found in licensing contracts. For instance, as predicted by the model, Contractor 
(1981) finds that the amount of know-how and services that licensors provide is increasing in 
the first period payment. Direct testing of the theory would require detailed information on 
the tacit and codified components oflicensed technologies, an unlikely possibility. However, 
indirect tests are possible. A key implication of the theory is that tacit know-how, when it is 
provided, should be bundled with complementary inputs on which licensor has well defined 
property rights. Arora (1996) using data from 144 technology import agreements by Indian 
firms during 1950-1975, confirms the supply of the technological services is more likely 
when the contracts involved associated complementary inputs such as patents. Thus, arm's 
length contracts can overcome the problems in contracting for know-how by bundling 
complementary inputs with know-how in a technology package, and leveraging the superior 
enforceability of contracts over the latter. 
Further, although asymmetric information and moral hazard are serious problems, they 
can be mitigated through a variety of contractual and institutional responses. There is 
abundant research showing how non-disclosure agreements, long-term contracts, repeated 
contracting, reputation building and social norms can overcome many of the information 
based problems that are thought to afflict transactions for technology. Indeed, insofar as 
moral hazard, uncertainty and asymmetric information are likely to be more important at the 
early stages in the development of technology, the flourishing venture capital sector suggests 
that they do not pose an insurmountable problem to contracting. 
3.3 Financial constraints to the rise of specialized technology suppliers 
The issues involved in financing R&D are well known, have received a great deal of 
attention, and we shall review this topic only briefly. Raising capital to finance R&D, 
especially at the initial stage, is perceived as a major problem for many technology based 
18 The model is also robust to extensions like asymmetric information about the ability of the licensee to "invent 
around", and to re-negotiation proof contracts. 
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startups. Relatedly, the ability to provide and finance risky development was seen as an 
advantage of integrating R&D within large firms. Later research, surveyed in Cohen (1995), 
has questioned this assumption. Further, even if internal capital is cheaper than capital raised 
from the market because of a variety of problems related to asymmetric and imperfect 
information (e.g., Leland and Pyle, 1977), this advantage may be offset to some degree by 
incentive and commitment problems. 
In recent years, financial intermediaries and especially venture capital firms, are 
playing an increasingly important role in financing high technology startups. In 
biotechnology, software, telecommunications and a variety of other sectors, technology-based 
firms with strong intellectual property protection now have access to a number of venture 
capital funds. 19 Although venture capitalists own only about 1 % ofU.S. equity, they fund a 
substantial share of the companies that go public, especially in the high-technology sectors. 
In addition to finance, financial intermediation is also thought to be valuable in providing 
startups with useful advice and guidance (Lerner, 1995). An important consequence of the 
development of the venture capital sector is that it is now reaching outside the US to fund 
promising technology specialists in countries such as UK, Israel, and even India?O 
Although far from conclusive, the experience of the biotechnology, software, and 
telecommunication sector suggests that financial constraints on the division of innovative 
labor are not insurmountable, and that if allowed to, the financial sector does respond by 
developing institutions capable of supporting a division of innovative labor. Even a country 
as small as Israel has over fifty venture capital funds that finance Israeli startups. European 
and Japanese economies seem not to do as well, and the absence of venture capital has been 
noted as an important contributory factor. Perhaps bartks can partially substitute for venture 
capital, but this is an area that requires further research. 
4. The division of innovative labor and the extent of the market 
The previous two sections suggested that general-purpose technologies, or generic 
knowledge bases, are key for the rise of markets for technology. In the first place, the breadth 
of their applications implies that the size of their market is larger than that of a single firm or 
industry, and this encourages the formation of firms specialized in the production of 
technology (see figure 3 for evidence from chemical industry). Second, although their 
production requires a great deal of tacit expertise, abstraction and generality are likely to 
imply stronger patent protection, that can make it easier to transfer the tacit and intangible 
components of technology too. Further, such knowledge is also easier to move across 
contexts and also provides the framework within which context specific information can be 
"unstuck", possibly by embedding in a software tool or development environment. 
We next analyze the incentives that firms, typically the upstream technology suppliers, 
have to invest in creating general-purpose technologies. In particular, we examine how these 
19 Lemer and Merges (1998) show that US biotechnology fIrms raised over $4 billion from venture capital funds 
between 1989 and 1995. If one includes other sources such as R&D fInancing, private placement and equity 
issue, they were able to raise over $19 billion. 
20 Moreover, large established fIrms themselves are beginning to use venture investing as a means of acquiring 
technology. Corporate venturing, as this process is sometimes called, is gaining prominence over time (Fortune, 
Dec 1998). According to Bio World Today, an industry newsletter, the total public capital raised from biotech 
initial and follow-on offerings in 1997 was approximately $2.5 billion, while the total amount that big 
pharmaceutical companies contributed to biotech companies, either through investment or alliance, was $4.5 
billion (cited in Grove" 1998c). Companies are looking beyond national boundaries as well, with Japanese and 
European fIrms investing in US biotechnology fIrms (see for instance, Teece, 1992), and US fIrms investing 
overseas, particularly in the information technology sector. 
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incentives are conditioned by the size and structure of demand. The issue is important 
because there is a substantial difference between the production of general-purpose 
components and the development of specific technologies. The former implies a higher fixed 
cost, but a lower marginal cost for applying them to different uses. Dedicated technologies 
imply a smaller fixed cost but a higher marginal cost for using them in domains other than the 
one in which and for which they were created. Moreover, we saw that historically companies 
have not invested in general-purpose technologies or in generic knowledge bases, but mainly 
in technologies that work for their own specific purposes. For these reasons, it is important to 
explain why and when one observes that firms (or industries) invest in more general 
technologies and knowledge bases. 
Bresnahan and Gambardella (1998) develop a model that addresses this issue. 
Consider a firm operating in one of the N distinct final markets where it is confronted with the 
following two choices. On the one hand, it can develop its own dedicated technology by 
incurring an application-specific fixed cost F. On the other hand, it can buy a general-purpose 
technology supplied by a specialized upstream technology sector. If so, it avoids the fixed 
cost F, but instead pays a price w per unit of the general-purpose input purchased.21 A key 
feature of the model is that when firms buy the general-purpose input, the full price is w + d, 
where d is a unit cost increase due to the fact that, unlike dedicated technologies, the general-
purpose inputs have standardized features that have to be customized to the firm's 
requirements. The model assumes that the upstream sector can lower d by incurring a fixed 
cost G. The variable d can then be thought of as the output of an activity carried out by the 
upstream sector to make the technology less "distant" from each applications, and more 
general purpose. 
Suppose that there are N firms in the market, corresponding to N different 
applications, and these firms are monopolists in their own markets?2 The potential size of the 
final markets of each application (firm) is denoted by 8, which is a random variable. Note 
also that Nand 8 measure two dimensions of the size of the market. N is the number of 
potentially different applications, 8 is the size of each application. 
The key theorem of the model is that the upstream industry has a greater incentive to 
lower d the larger the number of downstream applications N, and the lower (in the sense of 
first order stochastic dominance) the distribution of 8.23 Thus, the development of general-
purpose technologies is more likely in cases in which there is a larger differentiation of the 
final downstream markets. This creates greater opportunities for the upstream sector to invest 
in these technologies, and for the downstream sectors to buy them rather than producing 
dedicated technologies in-house. By contrast, a larger economy in the sense of larger size of 
the individual applications is one in which the upstream sector is smaller, and the upstream 
technology is more distant from the applications. 
The model also shows that any exogenous factor that reduces the costs of developing 
the generic technology, such as an increase in the supply of trained engineers and scientists 
and exogenous advances in science and instrumentation, increases the output of the general 
purpose technology. This clarifies that the critical dimension of market size for the division 
21 For simplicity, one can think of more inputs as access to broader and deeper technological knowledge. In the 
software analogy, it may imply getting more functional modules and libraries. 
22 Assuming greater competition would complicate the model, but not change the basic results. 
23 The model shows that given d firms whose size S is larger than a certain threshold will make the technology 
in-house, while firms with S smaller than the threshold will buy the general-purpose input. The intuition is 
straightforward. Larger firms have larger internal markets to spread the fixed cost of dedicated technologies, and 
hence they are more likely to invest in their own technique. Another fairly natural implication of the model is 
increases in d lower the threshold beyond which firms rely on in-house technology. 
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of labor between firms is breadth of application rather than depth. Further, it reinforces and 
amplifies the importance of generality and abstraction of knowledge - the greater the 
generality, the lower the cost of adapting the knowledge to specific application. Finally, these 
results can also be reinterpreted as pointing to the role of software tools in reducing the 
economic distance between abstract knowledge and specific but differing applications. 
The notion of general-purpose technology is related to Rosenberg's concept of 
technology convergence. In his study of the US machine tool sector in the 19th century, 
Rosenberg (1963 and 1976) noted that a variety of industries such as firearms, bicycles, 
sewing machines, typewriters and automobiles, had to perform metal cutting operations that 
were very similar to (e. g., boring, drilling, milling, planing, grinding, and polishing). 
Initially, the firearms makers produced their own machines, because firearms was among the 
first of these sectors to develop.24 Over time it was recognized that a large number of 
application sectors, from sewing machines to automobiles, required a common set of metal 
cutting, bending and shaping operations. Once conceptualized thus in the abstract, lathes, 
mills and machine tools of various sorts that carry out these operations were developed and 
supplied by specialized machine-tool makers. 
Rosenberg's machine tool sector exemplifies many of the important insights discussed 
here. Machine tools emerged as a separate general purpose technology sector when two 
conditions were satisfied. A large number of downstream application sectors developed, and 
these sectors were eventually seen to be relying on fundamentally similar technologies. 
Learning and knowledge from one application sector was received, conceptualized and 
captured in better, more accurate and more flexible machine tools, with the resultant 
productivity benefits accruing to all application sectors downstream. (See also Bresnahan and 
Trajtenberg, 1996.) Finally, innovations in machine tools became the responsibility of 
specialists, the upstream machine tool producers (although users may have played an 
important role as well). 
5. Markets for technology, licensing, and the role of competition 
The discussion thus far has focused on the emergence and growth of firms specialized 
in the supply of technology. However, when a market for technology develops, it lowers 
entry barriers and increases competition. Such competition affects the incentives of 
incumbent firms that hold proprietary technology to license it. Further, the presence of rival 
sources of technology, particularly from specialized firms, is a powerful spur to technology 
licensing. Thus, a market for technology may include technology being licensed and sold by 
large firms with significant production and commercialization capabilities as well. 
For instance, Arora (1997) has documented extensive technology licensing by well 
known chemical firms such as Union Carbide, Dow, Du Pont, Exxon and Shell. Indeed, Dow 
and Exxon are actively competing to license their proprietary technologies for metallocene or 
single site catalyts for polyethylene and polypropylene, a market estimated to be worth over 
$2 billion. Many of these firms have explicitly set targets for their licensing revenues. 
Hoechst plans to earn over $100 million by the year 2000, while Du Pont hopes to reach that 
target a few years later. This trend is not confined to the chemical industry. In 
semiconductors, where the market for technology is also active, one sees a similar picture. In 
1998, industry observers expect IBM to generate $750 million from its patent portfolio, twice 
24 The so-called American system of manufactures played an important role. In the US, articles such as rifles 
and muskets were produced as standardized modular commodities with interchangeable parts. By contrast, in 
Europe, rifles and muskets were produced to the physical specifications of the individual user, the difference 
being similar to the that between a tailor made suit and one sold off the rack (Rosenberg, 1976). 
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as much as it collected just four years earlier. Texas Instruments, which earned over $1 
billion in the early 1990s, and $800 million from its patent portfolio in 1995, could earn even 
more in the future (Grove, 1998b). 
This marks something of a challenge to traditional wisdom that holds that innovations 
are best exploited by commercializing them oneself (e.g., Teece, 1988). The reasons why 
companies may not wish to license their technologies are well known. Apart from the 
transaction cost arguments dealt with above, there is a straightforward reason: By licensing 
firms create new competitors, thereby reducing their profits. Put differently, licensing has a 
rent dissipation effect. But licensing also provides revenue from the sale of the technology. 
The question is then under what conditions the revenue effect is larger than the rent 
dissipation effect. 
This way of approaching the problem has another twist that is worth emphasizing 
here. The theoretical literature on licensing has problems in providing a satisfactor~ answer 
to the question above because it typically assumes a monopolist technology holder. 5 By 
contrast, a substantial fraction of innovations do not provide the innovator complete 
monopoly in the product market. This creates a "commons" problem, where the profits from 
an oligopolistic market constitute the commons. A technology holder that can control entry is 
akin to an agent that holds the rights to access to the commons. As long as there are other 
users of the commons, i.e. the technology holder is not a monopolist, her incentives to sell 
access to the commons exceeds the collective interest -- the rent dissipation is shared with 
other users of the commons while the licensor alone· gets the revenues. With more than one 
firm having proprietary technology, the commons problem is exacerbated. 
This model is formalized by Arora and Fosfuri (1998b). Formally, if ;r{N) is the profit 
of the typical firm when there are N firms in the industry, then an incumbent marginal payoff 
from licensing (assuming the licensor captures all surplus) is 2rc{N+ 1) - rc(N), which for N > 1 
can be greater than zero. Thus, with more than one incumbent the revenue effect from 
licensing can be greater than the rent dissipation effect. As a result, not only may firms 
compete to supply products, but also to supply technologies?6 Following this intuition, the 
model leads to three main results: 
i) Stronger intellectual property rights decrease the transaction costs, which affect the 
licensor's payoff from licensing. Hence, stronger intellectual property rights increase the 
extent of licensing. Stronger intellectual property rights may also enable the licensor to 
capture a larger share of the rents, which also increases licensing.27 However, insofar as 
broader patent scope results in greater product differentiation, broader patent scope will 
lower licensing. Similarly, insofar as a higher novelty bar reduces the number of 
technology holders, this too reduces licensing. 
ii) Licensing is more widespread the lower the degree of product differentiation across 
competing technologies. Intuitively, this is because by licensing the firm would create a 
rival that is closer to him in the product space than to other incumbents. The rent 
2S See for instance Gallini (1984), Katz and Shapiro (1985), Shepard (1987), Gallini and Wright (1990). 
26 The reason why with more than one incumbent the possibility of licensing arises is that in this case the loss 
due to increased competition is shared with the other incumbents in the market, or put differently, the firms do 
not fully internalize the rent dissipation effect. 
27 Consider a situation where once the technology holder enters into licensing discussions with a potential 
licensee, the latter can use the information revealed to invent around (e.g., Gallini, 1992; Arora, 1995). The 
stronger the patent protection, the greater the cost of inventing around, and hence, the larger the share of the 
surplus that the licensor can capture in the subsequent negotiations. 
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dissipation effect is then internalized by the licensor to a greater extent, and this reduces 
the profitability of the licensing strategy. 
iii) Technology suppliers that lack the downstream assets to operate in the final markets 
sell more licenses. While this result is completely intuitive (the technology suppliers have 
no rents to dissipate from greater downstream competition), the model also throws up a 
less straightforward result: The presence of such firms induce other downstream producers 
to license their technologies as well. This is because given that others license their 
technologies and create new competitors, the rent dissipation effect arises in any case, and 
therefore the downstream producers may well try to compete in the market for technology 
to sell some of their licenses. 
The latter result is particularly interesting within the framework of this paper, as it 
suggests that independent technology suppliers (like the SEFs discussed in Section 2 or even 
universities) have the additional effect of inducing the downstream producers to become 
technology suppliers as well. Moreover, up to a point, licensing by rivals increases the 
propensity of other technology holders to license as well. In sum, licensing strategies 
snowball, gathering strength over time. This line of reasoning suggests that markets for 
technology may be quite robust once they arise. 
Patterns of technology licensing in the chemical industry provide some support to the 
theoretical findings illustrated above. Arora and Fosfuri (1998a), using data on worldwide 
technology licensing in the chemical industry during the 1980s, find that the per-firm number 
of licenses decreases with the degree of product differentiation. Homogeneous sectors like air 
separation, pulp and paper, and petrochemicals are marked by extensive licensing, while only 
limited licensing is observed in differentiated product groups like pharmaceuticals and 
organic chemicals. More interesting, they also find that firms without downstream production 
facilities tend to license more and that in product groups where such firms operate more 
intensively, large chemical producers themselves tend to license more (see also figure 4). 
6. Fragmentation of intellectual property rights and other challenges 
The foregoing discussion has highlighted some of the benefits of markets for 
technology: They facilitate diffusion of technology, induce investment by downstream firms, 
and allow for firms in "smaller" markets to invest in "adapting" general-purpose technologies 
to the special needs of local users. However, when technologies, are cumulative and 
systemic, markets for technology may not always work well. 
Complex systems are often made of many components, sub-components and parts. 
Thus, the pace of technological progress depends on the actions of many firms responsible for 
the production of the components. The problem is that if property rights on technology 
components are assigned to different agents, each patent holder can have the right to exclude 
the others from the use of her component. This implies that in order to use the technology 
one has to collect all the rights for the use of its components. 
In a world with no transaction costs, agents will bargain to a Pareto superior solution 
given any initial distribution of property rights over the components. In a more realistic 
world, the required collection of property rights, although socially efficient, might not occur 
because of transaction costs and "hold-up" problems. An agent holding a patent on an 
important component ("blocking patent") may use her patent as a "hold-up" right in an 
attempt to extract as much of the value of her innovation as possible. 
Suppose that the development of a new technology involves the use of components 
invented and patented by other firms. In order to assemble the new technology either the firm 
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has to buy licenses on the components or alternatively it has to make the components in-
house. The licensing fee for each component is set up through a bargaining process. 
The analysis of this simple framework emphasizes three reasons that may induce a 
market failure in the presence of "blocking patents": a) lack of alternatives, b) excessive 
fragmentation of intellectual property, c) "hold-up" problems. These forces act as follows: 
i) The more difficult it is to develop the components in-house, the more likely it is that 
the technology will not be assembled in the first place. This is because when there are no 
alternative sources for the components, the bargaining position of the component holders is 
very strong. 
ii) The more fragmented the property of the components, the greater the number of 
transactions required, and hence, the less likely it is that the investment for the 
development of the technology will be undertaken. 
iii) When transactions in technology components occur sequentially, the system developer 
will retain only a small share of the total surplus. This is because once the system 
developer has purchased some of the components and these costs are sunk, the system 
developer's bargaining power is reduced. 
iv) Non-manufacturing firms that hold patents on key components are likely to bargain 
more aggressively for licensing fees. The strategies of firms that have significant market 
shares in the downstream markets (in which the technology is applicable) are more 
complex. However, they are likely to cooperate, particularly if there is a stable group of 
such firms. 
One example of what might occur when several companies hold patents on different 
components is provided by the early development of the radio (Merges and Nelson, 1990). 
The Marconi Wireless and Telegraph Company, AT&T, General Electric, Westinghouse all 
held important patent positions in the early stages of the development of the industry. The 
ensuing fragmentation of property rights is said to have caused serious delays in the pace of 
technological innovation. For instance, the basic patent on the diode was granted to Marconi, 
while the patent on the triode vacuum tube was assigned to AT&T. Marconi's patent was 
needed for using the triode technology, yet neither party would license the other and, as a 
consequence, no one used the revolutionary triode for some time. 
Similar situations arose in the early stages of development of the automobile and 
aircraft industry and in the chemical process technology industry. A more recent case is 
biomedical research. HelIer and Eisenberg (1998) are especially concerned with the 
increasing practice in biomedical research of defining property rights around isolated gene 
fragments. Since many commercial products, such as therapeutic proteins or genetic 
diagnostic tests, are likely to require the use of multiple fragments, a proliferation of such 
patents, held by different owners and licensed with stringent "pass throu~h" provisions, imply 
large costs for future transactions aimed at bundling the patents together. 8 
These concerns have been echoed by industry participants as well. Cecil Quillen, 
former Senior Vice President and General Counsel of the Eastman Kodak Company, claims 
that since the early 1980's, the legal costs of intellectual property protection has risen 
dramatically to the point of substantially raising the cost of innovation itself. Michael 
Rostoker, former head ofLSI Logic, a semiconductor manufacturer, has also suggested that, 
due to stronger patent protection, firms holding old technology have been in a position to 
command licensing fees from a current generation of innovators even while the original patent 
28 Pass-through provisions allow the technology holder to receive royalties on future innovations produced by 
using the licensed technology. These provisions are a matter of considerable debate in the biotechnology 
industry. 
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holders have long ceased advancing the state of the art, leading to a stacking of licensing fees 
that impede the development of new generations of chips (Hadley, 1998). 
When transaction costs make it difficult to put together the pieces of intellectual 
property required to commercialize a technology, not only is commercialization of technology 
delayed, other types of consequences follow as well. Some firms may cut back on R&D or 
move their research to other areas?9 Firms may also patent very aggressively, particularly if 
they foresee complicated cross-licensing negotiations with rivals. In turn, this may push firms 
into the "tragedy of the anti-commons" situation described by Eisenberg and Heller (1998). 
Based on their survey of industrial R&D Cohen et al. (1997) conjecture that the rapid increase 
in patent rates and infringement suits since the early 1980's may partly reflect the growing use 
of patents as weapons in mutually reinforcing, non-cooperative strategic interactions. 
Although fragmentation is a serious problem, there are a number of responses that can 
ameliorate it. Cross-licensing agreements, although costly to negotiate, are a partial solution. 
For instance, Anand and Khanna (1997) find that cross-licensing agreements are common in 
electronics and semi-conductors. Grindley and Teece (1995) attribute the extensive use of 
cross-licensing agreements in electronics and semiconductors, where innovations are typically 
based on hundreds of different existing patents, to the large transaction costs required to 
bundle together patent portfolios. Similarly, in biotechnology, firms holding complementary 
technologies do license each other, and firms with generic research tools such as PCR offer 
these on a non-exclusive basis. Patent pools are another traditional solution that has been 
applied in the oil refining industry, and more recently, in the semi-conductor industry.3o 
In the chemical process industry, technology-sharing agreements were established to 
alleviate the transaction costs involved in market relationships (Arora, 1997). The case of the 
chemical process industry is interesting for another reason as well. SEFs have sometimes 
acted as technology integrators that have helped in getting around the "hold-up" problem of 
fragmented property rights. Thus, another potential benefit of specialized technology 
suppliers is that they can act as technology integrators to limit the hold-up problem created by 
the fragmentation of intellectual property rights. 
Sensible public policy can also do much to mitigate the worst consequences of 
fragmentation of intellectual property rights. In many instances, the fault may be with patent 
offices that issue overly broad and imperfectly specified patents. Given the presumption of 
validity, such patents can serve as blocking patents. Often, broad and imprecise patents are 
issued because patent offices are under-funded, the patent examiners not adequately trained 
and lacking the necessary capabilities to search for the prior art. In software, for instance, the 
US patent office has issued what are widely seen as overly broad patents, in large measure 
because the examiners rely very heavily upon previous patent applications to discover prior 
art. Since software patents are relatively new (copyrights having been the typical way of 
protecting software until recently), the result is bad and socially harmful patents, which 
nonetheless carry with them the presumption of validity. 
In some cases, policies designed in the naIve hope of encouraging small inventors 
have encouraged the abuse of the patent system. In the US, for instance, there have been well 
known cases where patents filed in the 1950s ultimately issued more than twenty years later. 
In the meantime, the patentee could legally amend the application so that it covered 
29 Lemer's research (Lemer, 1995) shows that small, less well funded biotechnology firms tend to stay away 
from research areas populated by larger, better capitalized competitors. 
30 More nuanced institutional arrangements are also possible. For copyrights, organizations such as ESCAP that 
hold the copyrights of individual song writers and singers and collect fixed royalty payments for their use on 
behalf of the artists, have worked well. 
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inventions made well after the filing date. Since patents in the US are published only upon 
issue, many established firms have been surprised by such patents (sometimes referred to as 
'submarine' patents because they are not visible for long periods after they are filed). The 
move towards patent harmonization, which will require publication of all patent applications 
after a certain period, will be helpful in this respect. 
Another important public policy intervention would be to pay more attention to 
patenting requirements. Specifically, in the US, the patentee is required to "reduce to 
practice" the invention, demonstrate the best known way the invention is to be used or 
"enabled" and show the usefulness or "utility". Over the last few years, these requirements 
have not been enforced very seriously, at least in certain well known cases. For instance, 
patents on gene fragments (ESTs) have been issued without any clear knowledge of what 
proteins the gene fragment was coded for, and what functions the proteins performed. In 
principle, these fragments may prove to be useful in a broad spectrum of applications, as yet 
unknown. If granted, the patent holder may be able to demand a large share of the rents from 
any such applications or even block such applications, without having contributed to their 
discovery. Public policy can also help by encouraging patent pooling and cross-licensing 
(after verifying the absence of anti-trust motives). 
A second set of, more controversial, policies whose merits remain under debate is the 
extension of "eminent domain" (i.e., the legal doctrine that allows the government to take 
over private property for public purpose) to intellectual property. In principle, the threat that 
the government may step in and buy out a patent holder at a "fair" price can be a powerful 
deterrent to the sort of opportunism that underlies the fragmentation problem. But 
governments may not be the best agencies to take over a technology where public good 
considerations might be quite indirect. Determining the price for the patent is an important 
challenge. A recent paper by Michael Kremer (1998) suggests using an auction as mechanism 
to determine the private value of patents. The government would use this price to buy out the 
patents and place them in the public domain.3 ! Alternatively, the law may simply allow for 
"efficient breach" - i.e. let people "infringe" the patent and leave the courts decide about a 
"fair" royalty". The latter is very similar in spirit to the compulsory licensing provisions and 
provisions that require the patent to be "worked". Both of these provisions have been present 
in many countries, especially in the past, and require courts to intervene more aggressively 
than it is probably desirable.32 
7. The effects of markets for technology 
7.1 Division of labor, investment and technology spillovers 
Not only does a division of innovative labor promote the development of technologies, 
but it also enables these technologies to be utilized more effectively. Put differently, markets 
for technology enhance both the generation and the diffusion of technology. The logic is 
simple - technology specialists have an incentive to seek out buyers for their services and 
help them use the technology. In this way, growth impulses can be transferred from the early 
movers to the late corners. In a seminal paper, Rosenberg (1966) describes how automobile 
producers benefited from the technologies and tools developed for the bicycle producers in 
the 19th century. At a later stage, these same machine tool producers also helped develop 
31 However, in order to provide auction participants with an incentive to truthfully reveal their valuations, the 
~overnment would randomly select a few patents that would be sold to the highest bidder. 
2 "Eminent domain" and "efficient breach" entail very different visions about intellectual property rights. Most 
likely, they require a "sector by sector" approach which can only be used to a limited extent. 
19 
manufacturing industries outside the US. Similarly, the textile machinery suppliers of 
Manchester promoted the diffusion of textile technology to Japan, India, and China. 
The chemical industry provides a more recent example of the same phenomenon 
whereby the development of an upstream industry of specialized technology suppliers 
improves access, lowers investment costs, and reduces barriers to entry in the downstream 
industry, with implied beneficial effects on aggregate investment in the latter.33 As described 
earlier, beginning in the 1930s and continuing into the 1960s, the rapid growth of the 
chemical industry in the developed countries ('first world') stimulated the growth of firms 
that specialized in the design and engineering of the chemical processes - the SEFs. This also 
implied that, since the 1970s, as a modem chemical industry emerged in the less developed 
countries (LDCs), it benefited from the presence of an upstream sector of technology 
suppliers in the first world. SEFs had already accumulated expertise in plant design and 
technology, which could be supplied to the chemical firms in LDCs without having to invest 
again in the fixed costs that were necessary to accumulate this expertise. Simply put, the 
growth of the chemical industry in the first world created an upstream sector, which later 
spurred the growth of the chemical industry in the developing countries. 
Figure 5 illustrates the two effects that we want to highlight. First, the growth of the 
first world market for a given chemical process encourages the rise of engineering firms 
specialized in the design of chemical plants for that process. This only requires that entry as 
an SEF have a fixed cost (corresponding to the cost of acquiring technical expertise), and that 
the price-cost margins (profits per unit of output) that SEFs earn, decline with the number of 
SEFs in that sector. 
The second effect is from the SEFs in the first world to the size of the LDC market. 
To understand this effect suppose that first world SEFs could not supply LDCs. Then, apart 
from relying on multinationals, LDC firms would have to provide the services themselves or 
rely on domestic SEFs that may exist. In either case, LDC firms would face very high costs. 
As a result, fewer investments in chemical plants would be built. Given the high 
transportation costs for many chemical products, this would imply slower growth of 
chemicals, and industrial activity more generally in LDCs. 
This simple story relies on the assumption that the critical input - technology and 
engineering expertise -- is easily 'tradable' across countries. It is then important to 
understand why is this input tradable. Even though an ammonia plant in the US is a different 
object from an ammonia plant in India, what remains unchanged are the basic principles of 
how an ammonia plant should be designed and engineered. Clearly, applying what one has 
learnt in one place in another is not always easy, and the literature has shown that technology 
transfer is not costless (see Section 2). The important point, however, is that the transfer cost 
are substantially smaller than the cost of developing the technology, an assumption that fits 
especially well in the case of engineering services, and more generally in the case of 
"generic" technologies which can be applied at low additional cost in different locations and 
contexts. Note that from the point of view of the LDCs, the number of potential suppliers 
(first world SEFs) is determined by the extent of division oflabor in the first world, which 
occurred prior to the rise of LDC chemical markets. Thus, the organization of the industry in 
the first world, or to be precise, the extent of division of labor in the first world, enhances the 
growth of the market (chemical industry) in the LDCs. 
Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella (1998) provide quantitative estimates of the 
importance of a division oflabor in the chemical industry, using data data on nearly 140 of 
33 This section draws heavily upon Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella (1998). 
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the leading chemical technologies.34 The empirical analysis shows that investments in 
chemical plants in the LDCs are greater, the greater the number of technology suppliers 
(SEFs) that operate in the first world. Moreover, as predicted by their theoretical model, the 
effect of SEFs is greater for chemical firms from developing countries rather than for MNCs 
investing in developing countries. 
In more quantitative terms, the results imply that in a typical chemical technology, an 
additional SEF would imply additional investment of about $5.4 million over the ten year 
period from 1980-90, with the increases being larger in larger countries like China and India, 
and smaller in smaller countries (see figure 6). For the LDCs as a whole, the increase in 
investment would be more than $205 million per process, about 6.5% of the investment per 
process in developing countries as a whole (which is about $3.3 billion over the ten year 
period). To get further perspective, note that the average cost of a plant in our data is about 
$121 million. Thus, for a typical process, two additional SEF would result in about three 
additional plants in the developing world over a ten year period. 
In a somewhat different context, one might have conceptualized the phenomenon 
discussed in this section as international technology transfer. Undoubtedly, SEFs are 
important sources of chemical technology, but many large chemical firms also transfer 
technology overseas. However, as discussed in Section 5 above, chemical producers have to 
tradeoffthe gains from selling technology against the loss in actual or potential revenues from 
selling the downstream product. On the other hand, SEFs provide technology with few 
strings attached and will sell their technology and expertise to all. In so doing, they have truly 
helped create a market for technology, from which many developing countries have benefited. 
Thus, in addition to the classical gains from productivity improvements, specialization and 
division of labor can have other benefits for industrial growth that are sometimes overlooked. 
7.2 Division of Innovative labor and the locus of inventive activity 
Markets for technology also impinge on another important issue - the localization of 
inventive activities. Although the analysis will be centered on the geographical distribution of 
these activities, we will see that the term localization can be interpreted broadly, to mean for 
instance whether inventive activities should be located near the users vis-cl-vis the producers, 
or the organization of innovative activities within multinational enterprises. These issues 
have ramifications for broader economic questions of regional economic growth and 
divergence across regions and are widely debated today both in the economic (e.g., Krugman, 
1991) and in the management literature (e.g., Porter, 1998).35 
However, the debate has largely revolved around the trade-off between the advantage 
of being close to the user, which argues for locally based innovative activity, and the fixed 
cost aspect of research, which argues for centralized research. The conceptual apparatus 
developed for analyzing markets for technology, especially the idea of generic, basic 
knowledge that acts as the foundation for general purpose technologies, helps advance this 
debate.36 
34 Data on chemical plants in LDCs are drawn from our Chemintell (1998) database described in Arora, Fosfuri 
and Gambardella (1998). 
35 Granovetter (1985) has emphasized the importance of being "embedded" in the local context as a source of 
competitive advantage for firms. Against this, others have argued that small market size disadvantages regions 
in a globalizing world because locally based inventive activity will be overwhelmed by the fixed cost advantage 
enjoyed by firms based in larger regions. 
36 This section draws upon Arora, Gambardella and Rullani (1997). 
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The starting point of the analysis is a stylized distinction between two modes of 
producing innovations. The first mode is the one we label "technological integration". In this 
regime, research and the other activities leading to the development of innovations cannot be 
separated in space or across organizations. Following the points already made, this is a 
regime where feed-backs and interactions between various stages of the innovation process 
require physical proximity (in one interpretation) or being part of the same organization. The 
second regime, which we label "technological modularity", is one in which the different 
stages of the innovation process, particularly research and the adaptation of innovations to the 
users, can be separated. This is typically the case of general-purpose technologies or generic 
competencies that can be produced in one place and transferred to others at relatively low 
"transportation" costs. 
Which of these two modes will prevail and under what conditions? Put differently, 
under what conditions are innovations generated more efficiently by firms "embedded" in the 
contexts where the innovations have to be produced and sold, vis-a-vis firms located in areas 
that are distant from these contexts? Arora, Gambardella and Rullani (1997) develop a simple 
model to address this question. In their model, firms incur a fixed research cost and an 
application development cost that increases with the number of "variants" of the innovation to 
be produced for each distinct user located in a given market. Among other things, the 
development costs of the variants depend on "communication" costs with the users, and these 
are proportional to the number of users with which the firm interacts, i.e. with the size of the 
local market. Moreover, firms located near users incur a lower unit communication costs 
because of the natural advantages of physical proximity. 
Under a regime of technological integration, firms face the familiar tradeoff. If they 
locate near the users, they can lower communication costs but other locations may be better 
for research because of better technological infrastructures or technological spillovers from 
other firms. If the two activities - research and application development - cannot be 
separated, smaller markets will probably be served from distant locations as compared to 
larger markets, where the cost saving from lower communication costs will be greater. 
The possibility of separating the production of upstream technological inputs and their 
downstream adaptation changes the terms of this trade-off. Each activity can in fact be 
located where there are better economies for their production. The key issue then becomes at 
what cost can the innovators embedded in local contexts acquire the technologies produced 
where the (fixed) research costs are smaller. This will depend on the "transportation" costs. 
Unlike tangible inputs, basic knowledge or technologies, once produced, can be transported at 
low costs. As long as these transportation costs are small enough, it is always profitable for 
the local firms to acquire them from "global specialists". 
Moreover, as long as local firms can acquire the technologies cheaply from outside, 
they have an advantage in adapting the innovations to the needs of the local users compared 
with outside firms. The point is that, under this regime, local markets are not penalized by 
their size. Thus, while with technological integration no inventive activity will take place in 
smaller markets, technological modularity implies that smaller markets will host adaptive 
innovation processes. 
In sum, compared with technological integration, technological modularity will lead to 
greater geographical concentration of the production of generic technologies and knowledge 
bases in areas that are more efficient at producing them. But this process will also encourage 
the growth of downstream innovation activities in smaller markets. Thus, greater 
(international) concentration of upstream technological activities will be paralleled by greater 
decentralization of activities aimed at adapting these innovations to the final users. With 
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technological integration, technologies that reduce the communication costs from a distance 
will further concentrate the innovation process in larger markets (because the opportunities of 
communicating with the users from a distance will be less costly). By contrast, with 
technological modularity, this will reduce the costs of moving the upstream technologies, and 
thus reinforce the centralization of upstream technological production, and the 
decentralization of adaptive innovation processes in local markets. 
As far as the geographical distribution of inventive activities is concerned, the analysis 
has an important normative implication for the growth of local innovation processes. With 
technological modularity, less developed regions can also be successful innovators provided 
that they effectively use a market for technology - that is, if they do not attempt to produce 
locally the full set of technologies that they need, but instead invest in monitoring and 
acquiring generic technologies from elsewhere. The absence of markets for technology would 
imply the entire R&D processes would be concentrated in larger or more advanced regions. 
The normative implications extend to other contexts as well. In the managerial 
literature, for instance, Norman and Ramirez (1993) argued that users increasingly "co-
produce" their goods and services with the producers by customizing goods to suit their 
needs. Insofar as this personalization is costly for the buyers, they may well choose to select 
the solutions provided by the producers. Clearly, in this respect, Norman and Ramirez (1993) 
have in mind what we have labeled a regime of technological integration. Since users pay a 
higher fixed cost than specialized producers to develop the innovation in-house, and they 
cannot spread the fixed cost over a large enough base of uses, they may well choose to use the 
solutions provided by the producers. This process is likely to involve costly and imperfect 
communications as users communicate their needs to producers. By contrast, with 
technological modularity, while the specialized producers incur the fixed costs of producing 
the generic "modules" or technologies, the users will adapt them to their needs as they will 
have better information on their special requirements. 
The case of software illustrates these issues particularly well. Prior to the 
development of broad, generic platforms such as Oracle for databases, typically users either 
developed their own software systems or used very restricted systems available. With the 
availability of broad platforms, users can now develop highly customized systems suited to 
their own needs. In so doing, the users minimize their own investments in understanding and 
developing the platform. Conversely, the users do not need to communicate their 
requirements to the platform developer.37 However, as discussed in Section 2 earlier, 
platform developers, in order to develop truly general purpose software, need to have a 
comprehensive understanding of the diverse user contexts. Similarly, Advanced RISC 
Machines, an innovative chip design company, licenses a flexible design and lets its 
customers enhance them with proprietary extensions according to their needs (Zerego, 1999). 
Typically such an understanding is built upon abstract models of user behavior in different 
contexts. 
Finally, the presence of markets for technology may also influence industry and 
product life cycles. For instance, Klepper (1996) provides a simple and persuasive model of 
industry evolution. In his model, early entrants that succeed in growing can spread the fixed 
cost of their innovative activity over a greater volume of sales. Consequently, they have a 
greater incentive to invest in R&D compared with later entrants, which tend to be smaller. 
This simple model gives rise to dynamics that can closely mimic how product markets such as 
37 It is true, however, the most applications are actually developed by outside consultants for the end users. 
Oracle and IBM are among the market leaders in providing such consulting services. The essential point 
remains unchanged. 
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televisions and tires have evolved. The absence of markets for technology is critical to 
Klepper's model- if firms can sell their innovation, smaller but more innovative firms may 
have a greater incentive to invest in R&D. Conversely, other entrants (similar to firms in less 
developed regions) can exploit other sources of competitive advantage by buying the 
technology they need. 
9. Implications for business and public policy 
8.1 Implications for corporate strategy 
An obvious implication of the rise of markets for technology is to increase the 
"penalty" of company strategies based on the notorious "Not-Invented-Here" syndrome. By 
taking advantage of technology being developed by other companies more efficient at that 
task, firms can exploit their comparative advantage, providing more value to their customers. 
All in all, by relying on technology markets, companies can take advantage of the economies 
that can be generated on an industry- rather than firm-wide scale. 
However, we must repeat what has been noted earlier: Outsourcing R&D is different 
from other types of outsourcing. Indeed, as Arrow (1962) pointed out, in order to buy 
information, one must already possess a great deal of it. Thus, Cohen and Levinthal (1989) 
and Rosenberg (1990) have argued that even when relying upon markets for technology, firms 
need substantial in-house technological capabilities. In turn, such capabilities may require 
that firms invest in R&D. Therefore, markets for technology are unlikely to imply that firms 
should scrap their in-house R&D departments. Instead, they are likely to imply that R&D 
projects and capabilities should be developed so that the firm can effectively acquire 
technologies from outside, and efficiently use those technologies in ways that leverage its 
own distinctive capabilities. 
The second implication is about corporate diversification. It is well known at least 
since Nelson's (1959) study, that technology-driven diversification is both the cause and the 
effect of investments in upstream "basic" research or technologies. Put differently, larger and 
more diversified firms have greater incentives to invest in "generic" technologies because 
they can spread the associated fixed cost on a larger number of internal products. (See also 
Chandler, 1990.) In fact, our analysis suggests that the implicit assumption ofthis argument 
is that the intra-organizational transfer of generic technologies and knowledge is markedly 
more effective than transfer between organizations. Once this limitation is removed, 
however, and markets for technology develop, diversification based on technological 
economies of scope becomes less compelling. Instead, diversification is more likely to be 
based on more idiosyncratic and specific capabilities such as supplier and customer 
relationships, and knowledge and experience in selling downstream. (See for instance 
Gambardella and Torrisi, 1998.) More precisely, technology-based diversification makes 
sense only when the technology in question is proprietary to the firm and is best exploited 
through internal investment rather than through a market for technology. 
In other words, when faced with reasonably well developed markets for technology, 
even large firms may consider licensing their technology to others. As noted earlier, an 
industry study by the BTG (1998) estimated that US companies hold about 115 billion dollars 
of technology assets that they do not utilize. These are typically assets developed by their 
R&D departments which are not used because they do not belong to their core business or 
simply because these companies do not have enough incentives to develop them in-house to 
commercialize the products. By selling the available technologies, these companies can 
increase their returns to R&D, and their overall market evaluation. Even if$115 billion of 
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untapped technology is an overestimate, it does point to the attitude of most established large 
corporations towards technology: In-house technology is like the crown jewels, and 
technology offered by outsiders is inferior and treated with suspicion.38 
The importance of licensing strategies is confirmed by the analytical model of 
licensing competition discussed earlier (see Section 5). There we showed that leading 
producers in a market can be induced to sell their technologies if their competitors do so as 
well, or if upstream technology specialists are active. As a positive statement we maintain 
that, as licensing strategies become more popular in a given industry, one ought to observe 
that companies will pay increasing attention to the opportunities that arise from selling their 
technologies. As a normative statement, we argue that companies should be increasingly 
attentive to these strategies especially if their competitors intend to license as well, or if 
specialized technology suppliers enter the market. 
Our final issue is about the fragmentation of intellectual property rights, which can 
pose a challenge to the functioning of a market for technology because of "hold-up" or related 
problems. As a result, patenting policies can become another critical area for company 
strategy. In addition, this can be a new important reason for developing technologies in-
house. If the rights on a given technology requires the consensus of a large number of patent 
holders, companies may have to develop the full technology in-house. We believe that this, 
rather the inability to utilize externally developed technologies, may in some industries be the 
critical limitation to the growth of a market for technology, and may push companies back 
towards full in-house integration of technological developments. Industry leaders can play an 
important role here through institutional mechanisms that ensure that inventors and patent 
holders, and technology commercializers, both share othe rents and neither acts to block the 
others. Through industry level discussions, firms holding broad, generic patents can also be 
persuaded to provide non-exclusive license on reasonable terms. In specific cases, groups of 
firms can enter into cross-licensing, patent pooling, or other types of arrangements that 
overcome fragmentation. 
8.2 Implications for public policy 
In common with any type of vertical disintegration, the presence of independent 
technology suppliers reduces the barriers to entry, especially for small firms and firms 
operating in less developed countries. It is these firms that benefit the most from not having 
to rely on developing technology themselves. In turn, their viability increases competition 
and variety in the industry. Furthermore, if generic technologies are available through a 
market, even small firms and firms located in underdeveloped areas can innovate. One can 
distinguish between two sets of policy measures -measures aimed at creating a division of 
innovative labor that underpins markets for technology and policy measures aimed at 
exploiting the advantages of such a division of labor. 
We have. already discussed the role of intellectual property rights in facilitating 
contracts for technology. Policy measures aimed at encouraging the formation of a 
competitive industry of independent technology suppliers may also be important for the 
growth of markets for technology. These firms tend to license their technologies, and in so 
38 An interview in 1995 with the then CEO ofDow Corporation, Frank Poppof confirms the essential truth of 
this exaggerated stereotype. He noted that before the late 1980s, one needed written authorization from the 
highest level in the company's management in order to buy or sell technology. He also agreed that things had 
changed dramatically and that Dow's investments in R&D were based, in part, on expectations of licensing 
revenues. Dow's current open attitude towards licensing metallocene (single site) catalysts is consistent with the 
changed attitude Poppof articulated. 
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doing, they also encourage downstream producers to license. Policy measures for creating an 
industry of specialist technology·suppliers range from the development of venture capital 
markets, direct or indirect R&D support to the creation of technology spin-off or start-up 
companies, and the creation of specialized technology intermediaries that monitor 
systematically the availability of "orphan technologies" and find potential customers for them. 
Strong intellectual property rights also encourage the rise of such firms. Intellectual 
property rights are of greater "value" to these firms than to large established technology 
holders. The latter have several means to protect their innovations - for instance through their 
extensive downstream manufacturing and commercialization assets. (See for instance Merges 
and Nelson, 1990.) By contrast, independent technology suppliers have fewer opportunities 
to appropriate their innovations other than legal protections. As a result, these are likely to 
have greater effects on the ex-ante innovation incentives of the technology specialists vis-a-
vis the established producers. 
A key issue in the case of intellectual property rights are the legal costs of enforcing 
them.39 Recent research supports popular belief that patent battles are very costly (e.g., 
Lerner, 1995). Thus, small innovative companies that are undercapitalized may become 
victims of better funded rivals who may lack strong patents but can credibly threaten to costly 
law suits. A part of the problem is simply that legal costs in the US are high. The other part 
of the problem is the uncertainty inherent in the way patents are examined and issued. In this 
respect, the development of alternative institutions for resolving patent related disputes is very 
important. In other countries, although legal costs may not be high, delays and lack of 
transparency can prevent the effective enforcement of patents. The increasing globalization 
also increases the value of greater harmonization of patents. 
Policies aimed at strengthening the ability of universities to diffuse their technologies 
are also likely to have significant benefits, as universities are typical cases of technology 
suppliers with no downstream assets. This suggests that, among other things, greater support 
to university research may have the additional advantage of inducing final producers to 
diffuse their technologies, with the related economic effects on investment, reduction of 
barriers to entry, and competition discussed above. However, there are a number of issues 
that arise in the context of greater university involvement in commercial activities. One of the 
thorniest of these is the deleterious impact upon academic norms within universities, with the 
erosion of collegiality and open science. As such, a full discussion of these issues is beyond 
the scope of this paper. See, inter alia, David (1992), Dasgupta and David (1994), Cohen and 
Florida (1999), and Rosenberg (1999) for further discussion. 
The other set of policies are those that maximize the realized advantages from markets 
for technology and the division of innovative labor. Simply put, as markets for technology 
arise, technology policies should aim not simply at generating new technologies but also at 
exploiting the use of existing technologies. We saw in Section 7 that a market for technology 
can enable less developed regions and firms to innovate. But public policy can help by 
discouraging these firms and regions from "re-inventing the wheel". 
Policy measures of this sort would require the creation of stimuli to monitor external 
(international) technological developments, develop local human capital, and set up local 
"absorptive" capability for acquiring externally developed technologies. In fact, this may 
imply that in these areas governments have to support, at least in part, local research of the 
same type as the one conducted in the leading regions. Absorptive capacity is quite often 
related to the ability of a given agent, area, or organization to perform research that is similar 
39 These costs increase with the degree of fragmentation of property rights. For a full discussion of possible 
policy interventions in situations of highly fragmented intellectual property rights, we refer to Section 7 above. 
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to the one that is acquired from the external sources. Nonetheless, it is also natural that the 
extent of this investment is probably smaller ifthe objective is to acquire rather than produce. 
More importantly, policy must guard against a "Not-Invented-Here" syndrome masquerading 
under the guise of self-reliance, patriotism or anti-imperialism. Dynamic learning 
considerations may suggest encouraging local inventive activity, perhaps even fundamental 
research work, in order to build capability so that the country or the region does not remain a 
follower forever. However, this would suggest focusing and targeting certain areas for 
fundamental research. Furthermore, a variety of policies and incentives that encourage the 
discarding of outside technology in favor of indigenously developed technology must be re-
evaluated.4o 
Greater support should therefore be given to institutions, organizations and firms for 
monitoring technological developments outside, and for research that uses the more basic 
technologies to develop localized applications. Many of these measures have already entered 
the agenda of policy makers in leading nations. For instance, a good deal of these issues are 
being discussed by institutions like the European Union (e.g., Lundvall and Borras, 1998), 
and similarly in the US. 
9. Conclusion 
Markets for technology have become increasingly important. However, the economic 
and managerial literatures, which have approached the analysis of these markets from 
different perspectives, lack a systematic and general view of the issues at stake. This essay 
has attempted to develop a comprehensive framework for a thorough understanding of how 
markets for technology work, what limits or gives rise to them, and what are their 
implications for corporate strategy and economic policy. 
40 Although indigenously developed technologies may be useful for many reasons, not the least because they 
may serve as exemplars and encourage other local firms and institutions to innovate, in many nations, the 
development of indigenous technologies has become an end in itself. 
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Table 1: Number and value of technology transactions, by sector of origin of technology, 
all countries, 1985-97 
Chemicals & Allied Products 
Business Services (Software) 
Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 
Industrial Machinery And Equipment 
Engineering & Management Services 
Instruments And Related Products 
Health Services 
Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods 
Transportation Equipment 
Communication 
Educational Services 
Rest 
TOTAL 
Source: Our calculations from the SDC Joint Venture database 
Number Value 
($ million) 
1615 34832 
1427 42299 
1089 60318 
899 17115 
754 21080 
504 11745 
254 4071 
122 1220 
116 
100 
82 
889 
7836 
1044 
9450 
5344 
4445 
212962 
Methodological Note: The figures are calculating by weighting the number of transactions by the average value 
of transactions for that sector. The value of the transaction consists of the licensing and royalty payments, equity 
purchase in technology source and R&D funding to technology source. Each transaction was verified to ensure 
that it involved a transfer of technology. The fumes) granting the technology were coded separately from the 
firm(s) receiving the technology. In case ofa cross-licensing agreement, the value was split equally between the 
firms. The averages are taken for all sectors for which four or more observations are available for licensing and 
royalty payments, and equity purchase and R&D funding. For the remaining sectors, we used the median of the 
transaction value, $5 million. 
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Figure 1: Number o/Technology Transactions by Year, 1985-97 
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• 
Figure 2: Share of chemical process technology licenses, 1980-90 
Source: Arora and Fosfuri (1998a) 
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Figure 4: Market share ofSEFs and propensity to license by chemical producers 
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Figure 5: The transmission of growth impulses 
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Source: Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella (1998) 
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Figure 6: Impact of an additional SEF: 
Additional investment per process, by country, in millions of us dollars 
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